\u3cem\u3eUnited States V. White\u3c/em\u3e: Disarming Domestic Violence Misdemeanants Post-heller by Coppolecchia, Elizabeth et al.
University of Miami Law School
Institutional Repository
University of Miami Law Review
7-1-2010
United States V. White: Disarming Domestic
Violence Misdemeanants Post-heller
Elizabeth Coppolecchia
Valerie Prochazka
Kelly F. Taylor
Follow this and additional works at: http://repository.law.miami.edu/umlr
Part of the Law Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by Institutional Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in University of Miami Law Review
by an authorized administrator of Institutional Repository. For more information, please contact library@law.miami.edu.
Recommended Citation
Elizabeth Coppolecchia, Valerie Prochazka, and Kelly F. Taylor, United States V. White: Disarming Domestic Violence Misdemeanants
Post-heller, 64 U. Miami L. Rev. 1505 (2010)
Available at: http://repository.law.miami.edu/umlr/vol64/iss4/12
United States v. White: Disarming Domestic
Violence Misdemeanants Post-Heller
ELIZABETH COPPOLECCHIA, VALERIE PROCHAZKA, AND
KELLY F. TAYLORt
I. INTRODUCTION
In June of 2008, the Supreme Court decided District of Columbia v.
Heller.' In that case, the Court held that the Second Amendment "con-
ferred an individual right to keep and bear arms" and that the District of
Columbia's wholesale ban on the possession of handguns in the home
violated that right.2 However, the newly proclaimed individual right was
"not unlimited."3 The Court qualified its holding by stating that "nothing
in [the] opinion should be taken to cast doubt" on certain "longstanding
prohibitions" on the possession of firearms by certain classes of persons,
on "laws forbidding" persons from carrying firearms in certain locations,
or on "laws imposing" restrictions on firearms dealers.4 This list of "pre-
sumptively lawful regulatory measures" was not intended to be exhaus-
tive; it simply provided examples of gun regulations that remained valid
even in light of Heller.'
Nevertheless, the Heller decision resulted in a deluge6 of chal-
lenges to firearms regulations. Earlier this year, the Eleventh Circuit had
occasion to consider one such challenge. In United States v. White,
Ludivic White, Jr., appealed his conviction for possession of a firearm
by a person convicted of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence, in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9), the "Lautenberg Amendment."7
Defendant White asserted, among other arguments, that section
922(g)(9) was unconstitutional post-Heller.8 In a brief section of the
opinion, the court concluded that section 922(g)(9) was "a presump-
t J.D. 2010, University of Miami School of Law; Editors of the University of Miami Law
Review.
1. 128 S. Ct. 2783 (2008).
2. Id. at 2799, 2821-22.
3. Id. at 2816.
4. Id. at 2816-17.
5. Id. at 2817 n.26.
6. See, e.g., United States v. Chester, No. 09-4084, 2010 WL 675261, at *1 (4th Cir. Feb.
23, 2010); United States v. White, 593 F.3d 1199 (1 1th Cir. 2010); United States v. Skoien, 587
F.3d 803 (7th Cir. 2010); United States v. Pettengill, No. CR-09-138-B-W, 2010 WL 374437 (D.
Me. Feb. 1, 2010); United States v. Engstrum, 609 F. Supp. 2d 1227, 1233-34 (D. Utah 2009).
7. 593 F.3d 1199, 1200 (11th Cir. 2010).
8. Id. at 1205.
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tively lawful 'longstanding prohibition[] on the possession of fire-
arms."9 Reasoning that the Court in Heller had explicitly reaffirmed the
constitutionality of felon-in-possession laws, and that the domestic abus-
ers the statute targeted were more dangerous than non-violent felons, the
Eleventh Circuit concluded that section 922(g)(9) must be among those
presumptively lawful regulatory measures since it was designed to keep
guns out of the hands of persons who are more dangerous than non-
violent felons.'°
Yet the quoted Heller dicta does not so directly address the ques-
tion of section 922(g)(9)'s constitutionality as might appear from read-
ing the White opinion." This Note argues that there are two flaws with
the Eleventh Circuit's approach in White. First, if the Second Amend-
ment right is a fundamental one-as appears likely from Heller-then a
court may not "presume" the constitutionality of a statute affecting that
right.' 2 Second, a close analysis of Heller's footnote twenty-six suggests
that the list of "presumptively lawful regulatory measures" is, in fact,
exhaustive as to categories of firearms regulations, but is not exhaustive
as to comparable classes of firearms regulations within each category.
Thus, a court faced with a constitutional challenge to an "unlisted" in-
possession regulation, such as section 922(g)(9), must make two distinct
determinations: (1) whether the prohibition at issue is comparable in
type to Heller's listed presumptively lawful measures, and (2) whether
the prohibition at issue qualifies as "longstanding."
This Note contends that, in light of the above understanding of the
Heller language, there must be some greater exploration of the constitu-
tionality of section 922(g)(9) than the court's somewhat conclusory
analysis in White. Section II introduces the statute at issue and provides
background to the Lautenberg Amendment. Section III explores the two
main reasons why courts must perform some greater level of analysis of
the constitutionality of section 922(g)(9). Section IV surveys recent
cases involving challenges to section 922(g)(9) as well as the possible
methods of evaluating the constitutionality of the statute. Section V
concludes.
II. THE LAUTENBERG AMENDMENT
In 1996, Congress passed the Lautenberg Amendment to the Gun
9. id. at 1206.
10. Id. at 1205-06.
11. In re United States, 578 F.3d 1195 (Murphy, J., dissenting).
12. See Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 320-21 (1993) ("a classification neither involving
fundamental rights nor proceeding along suspect lines is accorded a strong presumption of
validity").
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Control Act of 1968, codified at 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9). The amendment
makes it unlawful for anyone "who has been convicted in any court of a
misdemeanor crime of domestic violence" to possess a handgun that has
been in interstate commerce.1 3 The Supreme Court's holding in United
States v. Morrison'4 likely prevented Congress from legislating in the
area of domestic violence without some direct connection to interstate
commerce. Section 922(g)( 9 ) contains specific language that connects
the provision to interstate commerce,' 5 and lower courts have upheld the
statute as a valid exercise of Congress's power to regulate interstate
commerce.' 6 Senator Frank Lautenberg attached the amendment to the
Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act of 1997.'7
The policy behind the Lautenberg Amendment was to keep guns
out of the hands of individuals who pose a danger to those in their
household. The legislative history of section 922(g)(9) shows that Sena-
tor Lautenberg proposed the amendment because he was concerned
about the number of people who engage in serious domestic abuse, yet
who were still permitted to own firearms.' 8 This is because many of
these individuals either were not charged at all, or were only convicted
of misdemeanor offenses,' 9 and thus existing felon-in-possession laws
were not keeping firearms out of the hands of domestic abusers. The
Senate also considered that sixty-five percent of domestic murders
involve a gun.20
III. WHERE THE LOWER COURTS HAVE GONE WRONG
Much of the controversy surrounding the Court's decision in Heller
stems from a mismatch between a purportedly originalist opinion and an
unquestionably nonoriginalist result. More narrowly, however, this Note
13. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9) (2006).
14. 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
15. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9). The statute prohibits individuals convicted of domestic violence
misdemeanors from possessing a firearm that is "in or affecting interstate commerce." Id.
16. See, e.g., Fraternal Order of Police v. United States, 172 F.3d 898, 907-08 (D.C. Cir.
1999); Nat'l. Ass'n. of Gov. Employees, Inc. v. Barrett, 968 F. Supp. 1564, 1572 (N.D. Ga. 1997)
aff'd 155 F.3d 1276 (1998). For a discussion of Congress's power to enact the amendment under
its commerce clause powers see Kerri Fredheim, Closing the Loopholes in Domestic Violence
Laws: The Constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. §9 2 2(g)(9 ), 19 PACE L. REV. 445, 482-89 (1999).
17. 142 CONG. REc. S 11,872-01. See Tom Lininger, A Better Way to Disarm Batterers, 54
HASTNGS L.J. 525, 551-59 (2003) (discussing the legislative history of section 922(g)(9));
Melanie C. Schneider, Comment: The Imprecise Draftsmanship of the Lautenberg Amendment
and the Resulting Problems for the Judiciary, 17 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 505, 515 (2008)
(characterizing the amendment as an "obscure rider" attached to a "desperately-needed
appropriations bill").
18. 142 CONG. REC. S10,377 (1996) (statement of Sen. Lautenberg).
19. Id.
20. 142 CONG. REC. S9,628 (1996) (statement of Sen. Lautenberg).
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attempts to untangle two of Heller's doctrinal knots-the "fundamental"
right to bear arms and the "longstanding prohibitions"2 '-as they relate
to section 922(g)(9) and the White decision.
For our limited purposes, the phrase in Heller at issue is a mildly
convoluted qualifier to the majority opinion. As Justice Scalia explained:
[Njothing in our opinion should be taken to cast doubt on long-
standing prohibitions on the possession offirearms by felons and the
mentally ill, or laws forbidding the carrying of firearms in sensitive
places such as schools and government buildings, or laws imposing
conditions and qualifications on the commercial sale of arms.
22
In an opinion striking down a gun control regulation and professing an
individual right to bear arms under the Second Amendment,23 such a
statement seems awkwardly situated.24 Nonetheless, the statement has
become an oft-quoted passage25 from Heller as a means for lower courts
to dodge constitutional challenges to a wide array of gun control laws.
And the Court further qualified its statement by way of an even more
ambiguously drafted footnote: "We identify these presumptively lawful
regulatory measures only as examples; our list does not purport to be
exhaustive."26
These two statements, when operating in tandem, have the effect of
neutralizing nearly all federal gun control laws from constitutional
attack. For instance, a felon challenging a federal felon non-possession
law as abridging his or her constitutional individual right to bear arms
will not succeed under Heller. The court will merely quote Heller's
statement on "longstanding prohibitions," noting that prohibitions on
felons are specifically listed and then quickly determine under Heller's
footnote that such a law is "presumptively lawful." Those challenging
unspecified individual ownership prohibitions, such as domestic vio-
21. District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2816-17 (2008). See also United States v.
Engstrum, 609 F. Supp. 2d 1227,1233 n. 37 (2009) (noting that "the Heller Court did not declare
the presumption of lawfulness to be irrebuttable").
22. Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2816-17 (emphasis added).
23. Id. at 2821-22. See BRIAr DOHERTY, GUN CONTROL ON TRIAL xvii (2008).
24. See Darrel A. H. Miller, Guns as Smut: Defending the Home-Bound Second Amendment,
109 COLUM. L. REV. 1278, 1291 (2009) (explaining that the Court in "Helter purports to adhere to
the most disciplined of plan text and original public understanding methodologies. But at crucial
moments, it flinches. It cannot stomach the spectacle of the judiciary enforcing a right of felons,
[or] the mentally ill ... to keep and carry arsenals of lethal weapons"); Miguel E. Larios, Note, To
Heller and Back: Why Many Second Amendment Questions Remain Unanswered After United
Stated v. Hayes, 56 SEP FED. LAW. 58, 59-50 (2009) (explaining that Heller's list of exclusions
"provided lower courts with an easy way out when they are presented with constitutional
challenges to criminal convictions for the possession of a firearm by felons, the mentally ill, or
spousal abusers").
25. See discussion infra Part IV.
26. Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2816 n.26 (emphasis added).
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lence misdemeanants, may face a similar analysis. Such was the case in
White: The Eleventh Circuit "explicitly [held] that § 922(g)(9) is a pre-
sumptively lawful 'longstanding prohibition[ ] on the possession of fire-
arms,'" finding nothing in Heller to "cast doubt" on the statute's
constitutionality.27 In dismissing Defendant White's claim, the Eleventh
Circuit relied wholly on Heller's "presumptively lawful" language and
thus impliedly found it unnecessary to "scrutinize § 922(g)(9) apart from
the language in Heller.' 28
Perhaps this approach was precisely what the Supreme Court
intended. In its effort to individualize the right to bear arms under the
Second Amendment, the Court essentially destabilized decades of Sec-
ond Amendment jurisprudence in the lower courts. A shift from a collec-
tivist interpretation of the Second Amendment to an individualist
interpretation would not go unnoticed. With the removal of collectivist
theories from the lower courts' arsenals, the courts would need a new
basis for upholding second amendment challenges to federal, as well as
state, gun control regulations. "If the Court had found an individual right
to keep and bear arms but had refused to carve out a list of exceptions,
then federal courts today might be striking down all sorts of reasonable
gun control laws."29 Indeed, some scholars assert that Heller's non-
exhaustive list of longstanding, presumptively lawful regulatory mea-
sures was "calculated to reduce expectations among, for example, felons
convicted of possessing firearms in violation of federal law, who may
have otherwise thought that Heller represented a 'Get Out of Jail Free'
card"3 0 and "prevented lower courts from throwing into disarray the gun
control regimes of the fifty states and the federal government."3 In find-
ing section 922(g)(9) constitutional in light of Heller's caveat, the Elev-
enth Circuit upheld a gun control regulation that has, surely most would
agree, a profound basis in public policy.3 2
27. United States v. White, 593 F.3d 1206 (1 1th Cir. 2010).
28. United States v. Chester, No. 09-4084, 2010 WL 675261, at *1 (4th Cir. Feb. 23, 2010).
29. Adam Winkler, The Second Amendment Right and the Right to Bear Arms After D.C. v.
Heller, 56 UCLA L. REV. 1551, 1574 (2009).
30. Glenn H. Reynolds & Brannon P. Denning, Heller's Future in the Lower Courts, 102 Nw.
U. L. REV. 2035, 2039 (2008).
31. Winkler, supra note 29, at 1574.
32. See discussion supra Part H As noted, section 922(g)(9) was necessary because existing
felon-in-possession laws were not keeping firearms out of the hands of many domestic abusers
and "[flirearms and domestic strife are a potentially deadly combination nationwide." United
States v. Hayes, 129 S. Ct. 1079, 1087 (2009). In Hayes-a post-Heller decision-the Court
construed section 922(g)(9) and held that a domestic relationship need not be a defining element
of the predicate offense. Id. at 1082. The Court did not cite Heller and did not address explicitly
the statute's constitutionality. The Eleventh Circuit's White decision did not, however, rely on
Hayes as the basis for presuming section 922(g)(9)'s constitutionality; instead, the Eleventh
Circuit cited Hayes for the proposition that domestic abusers are violent and dangerous. 593 F.3d
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Lower courts have overwhelmingly clung-albeit in a variety of
forms3-to this Heller dicta as a kind of solace, a kind of protection
from a perceived unraveling of their second amendment jurisprudence.
Yet there is an enormous difference between upholding a regulation
after analysis and simply quoting Supreme Court language and conclud-
ing it applies. The Heller dicta does not directly address the question of
section 922(g)(9)'s constitutionality 34 : Defendant White was not a felon;
there was no suggestion that he was mentally ill; he was not in posses-
sion of the gun in a school or near a government building; nor was the
sale of the firearm at issue.35 Therefore, the Eleventh Circuit erred in
treating the Heller language as a sort of talisman against a finding of
unconstitutionality.
A. A Question Over the Fundamental Right to Bear Arms
For two reasons, more analysis was required to determine whether
section 922(g)(9) remained constitutional in light of Heller. First, if the
Second Amendment right is a fundamental one, then a court may not
"presume" the constitutionality of a statute affecting that right.36 Rather,
"challenges to firearms regulations under the Second Amendment must
be individually analyzed because such regulations restrict the exercise of
a constitutional entitlement."37 Without applying a recognized level of
scrutiny, the Eleventh Circuit perfunctorily classified section 922(g)(9)
as a "presumptively lawful 'longstanding prohibition[ ]."
While the Supreme Court has yet to hold whether the Second
Amendment right is a fundamental one,38 there are indications that it is,
beginning with the Heller opinion itself. "[L]anguage throughout Heller
at 1205. These misdemeanants are more dangerous than, for example, non-violent felons. Id.
Because Heller explicitly delineated "the possession of firearms by felons" as a longstanding,
presumptively lawful regulatory measure, section 922(g)(9) must be among those presumptively
lawful measures since it keeps guns out of the hands of persons who are more dangerous than non-
violent felons. Id. at 1205-06.
33. See discussion infra Part IV.
34. In re United States, 578 F.3d 1195 (Murphy, J., dissenting).
35. See generally United States v. White, 593 F.3d 1201-02 (11 th Cir. 2010).
36. See Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 320-21 (1993) ("a classification neither involving
fundamental rights nor proceeding along suspect lines is accorded a strong presumption of
validity").
37. United States v. Chester, No. 09-4084, 2010 WL 675261, at *1 (4th Cir. Feb. 23, 2010);
see also United States v. Skoien, 587 F.3d 803, 808 (7th Cir. 2009) (holding that in light of Heller,
"gun laws-other than those like the categorically invalid one in Heller itself-must be
independently justified").
38. However, currently before the Court is McDonald v. City of Chicago, presenting the
question of whether the Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms is incorporated as against
the States. Nat'l Rifle Ass'n v. Chicago, 567 F.3d 856 (7th Cir. 2009), cert. granted, McDonald v.
City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 48 (2009). Since one test under modem incorporation analysis asks
whether a right is "fundamental to the American scheme of justice," Duncan v. Louisiana, 391
1510 [Vol. 64:1505
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suggests that the right is fundamental by characterizing it the same way
other opinions described enumerated rights found to be incorporated."39
For example, the opinion observed that at the time of the founding, "the
right to have arms had become fundamental for English subjects."4 ° The
Court also noted that Blackstone "cited the arms provision of the Bill of
Rights as one of the fundamental rights of Englishmen"; indeed, having
and using arms for self-preservation and defense was a "natural right."'"
Moreover, the majority classed the Second Amendment rights among
other Bill of Rights amendments containing fundamental rights. The
Court observed that the Second Amendment, "like the First and Fourth
Amendments," codified a right that pre-existed the Constitution.42 Simi-
larly, the "Second Amendment ... [l]ike the First, . . . surely elevates
above all other interests the right of law-abiding, responsible citizens to
use arms in defense of hearth and home."4 3
Heller's holding that the Second Amendment confers an individual
right-akin to the rights contained in the First and Fourth Amend-
ments-to keep and bear arms (at least for the purposes of defense of
home and family) necessarily commands courts to scrutinize a statute
that permanently and absolutely bars gun possession by non-felons.
Indeed, in rejecting rational basis as the appropriate standard of review,
the majority found it "obvious[ ]" that some stricter level of scrutiny was
required to evaluate regulation of "a specific enumerated right, be it the
freedom of speech, the guarantee against double jeopardy, the right to
counsel, or the right to keep and bear arms."'" In light of Heller's hold-
ing-and despite its appealing "presumptively lawful" language-it is
likely that a court may not presume that section 922(g)(9) is
constitutional.
B. A Question Over Longstanding Prohibitions
But the lower courts have also lost sight of another key issue-the
Court's use of the term "longstanding" as a modifier to "prohibitions" as
compared with the remainder of Heller's list of exclusions. Heller's list
of "presumptively lawful regulatory measures" includes three catego-
ries: "longstanding prohibitions" on firearm possession by certain clas-
ses of individuals, "laws forbidding" persons from carrying firearms in
U.S. 145 (1968), it is possible that in ruling on McDonald the Court will resolve the question of
whether the Second Amendment right implicated under section 922(g)(9) is fundamental.
39. Nordyke v. King, 563 F.3d 439, 456-57 (9th Cir. 2009).
40. District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2798 (2008) (emphasis added).
41. Id. (citing 1 Blackstone 136, 139-40 (1765)).
42. Id. at 2797.
43. Id. 2821.
44. Id. at 2817 n.27.
2010]
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
certain locations, and "laws imposing" restrictions on firearms dealers.45
Worth noting is that "longstanding" only modifies the first category of
"presumptively lawful" firearms regulations. The remaining two catego-
ries are far less limited. In order for the prohibition on possession of
firearms by domestic violence misdemeanants to be constitutional in
light of a Second Amendment challenge, such a prohibition must be
"longstanding," whereas under Heller's list, a lower court might easily
uphold a recently enacted firearms dealer restriction.
One means of resolving this issue would be to assume that the
Court's statement that "our list does not purport to be exhaustive"
denotes a further qualification, allowing for exclusion of the three listed
categories and other unspecified categories of gun control regulations,
such as prohibitions on individual possession of firearms, which have
only recently been enacted. But such a view broadens Heller's list to a
point of irrelevancy. If the list is not limited to the three categories of
regulations specified then what reason could lie behind the use of the
term "longstanding" at all? The term becomes superfluous under this
framework.
A second, and more practical, resolution of the issue assumes that
Heller's list of exclusions is exhaustive as to categories of excluded fire-
arms regulations, but not exhaustive as to comparable classes of
excluded firearms regulations within each category. Essentially, a court
could uphold a prohibition on firearm possession by domestic violence
misdemeanants as a comparable class exclusion, but only if it can first
determine that such a prohibition is "longstanding." This Note argues
that within this framework, a court must make two distinct determina-
tions: (1) whether the prohibition at issue is comparable in type to Hel-
ler's specified exclusions, and (2) whether the prohibition at issue
qualifies as "longstanding." This Part addresses each determination in
turn.
4 6
1. SECOND AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENTIAL THEORIES-EVOLUTION
FROM COLLECTIVE RIGHTS TO INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS?
The Court's decision in Heller, above all else, theoretically shifted
Second Amendment jurisprudence away from collective rights theory
and toward an individual rights theory. In effect, however, no such shift
has occurred, primarily because of Heller's list of exclusions.47 A brief
historical analysis of Second Amendment jurisprudence must begin with
the language of the Amendment itself: "A well regulated Militia, being
45. Id. at 2816-17.
46. See discussion supra Part I.B.2-3.
47. See discussion infra Part IV.
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necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep
and bear Arms, shall not be infringed."48
Generally, two opposing views have developed from this language.
The first assumes that the phrase "a well regulated Militia, being neces-
sary" qualifies the right to bear arms as conferred on the states, rather
than the people individually, thereby permitting such a right to be exer-
cised solely by the people in collective form-collective rights theory.4 9
A second view, which treats the militia language as precatory, focuses
instead on the latter part of the phrase, reasoning that the government
cannot infringe on persons' rights to bear arms individually-individual
rights theory. 51
Akhil Reed Amar theorizes that collective rights theory ignores the
drafters' use of the term "people" in the Second Amendment. Where the
drafters conferred a right directly on the states they used the term
"states" as opposed to "people."'" Similarly, individual rights theorists
have ignored the historically military connotation of the phrase "bear
arms," further ignoring earlier drafts of the Second Amendment that had
48. U.S. CONST. amend. II. (emphasis added).
49. United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 553 (1875); Presser v. Illinois, 116 U.S. 252,
265 (1886). See also John Randolph Prince, The Naked Emperor: The Second Amendment and the
Failure of Originalism, 40 BRANDEIS L.J. 659, 677-78 (2002) (explaining that "[t]o the extent the
extremely limited judicial precedent reflects any model at all, that model is what until recently
seemed to be the orthodox view, that the Second Amendment only limits the federal government
from regulating state militias out of existence").
50. AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA'S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 322 (2006). See also
DOHERTY, supra note 23, at 1 (arguing that the Court's interpretation of the Second Amendment
in Heller "would have seemed perfectly natural to nearly any American of the founding era");
Prince, supra note 49, at 678 (arguing that "all that recommends the individual rights model is the
reading of framers' intent"); Sanford Levinson, The Embarrassing Second Amendment, 99 YALE
L.J. 637, 645-47 (1989) ("it seems tendentious to reject out of hand the argument that one purpose
of the Amendment was to recognize an individual's right to engage in armed self-defense against
criminal conduct"). But see David C. Williams, Civic Republicanism and the Citizen Militia: the
Terrifying Second Amendment, 101 YALE L.J. 551, 554 (1991) arguing that:
the error of those who today seek to guarantee a private right to arms is that
they would thereby consign the means of force to those who happen to possess
firearms-a partial slice of society-rather than to the whole people assembled in
militia. Even in the eighteenth century, literal universality was never more than a
rhetorical aspiration or a regulative ideal, but it was nevertheless the prevailing
ideal, and any departure from it meant failure. At a minimum, therefore, any modem
version of this militia must he so inclusive that its composition offers some
meaningful promise that it will not become the tool of a slice of society, as it could
in the case of those who decide for private reasons to buy a gun or to become
members of the national guard. The militia must be the people acting together, not
isolated persons acting individually.
Id. A purely collective rights formulation would allow wide-ranging gun control laws, while a
purely individual rights formulation would subject the least intrusive of gun control regulations to
constitutional scrutiny.
51. Id. at 322. See U.S. CONST. amend. X.
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included a conscientious objector clause.52 Despite the Court's conten-
tions in Heller,5 3 the framers' intent cannot readily be ascertained to
interpret the Second Amendment, though some statements may
enlighten.54
During the period between the late eighteenth century and the early
nineteenth century numerous states drafted their constitutions to provide
for the right of individuals to bear arms "in defence of himself' or
"themselves."5 5 But scholars are wary of the Court's reliance on such
provisions because they "postdate the ratification of the Bill of Rights,"
essentially they are inapposite to an originalist interpretation of the Sec-
ond Amendment.56 Such scholars further argue that despite Heller's
clever analytical incantations, these provisions provide no basis for an
individual right to bear arms for self defense.57
The Seventh Circuit's Judge Posner has remained critical of the
Court's decision in Heller, rejecting any claims that the Court derived an
individual right to bear arms from an originalist understanding of the
Constitution, but rather commenting that Heller is "evidence that the
Supreme Court, in deciding constitutional cases, exercises a freewheel-
ing discretion strongly flavored with ideology."58
2. LONGSTANDING PROHIBITIONS-QUALIFICATION IN COMPARABLE
CLASS TERMS
Heller's list excludes from constitutional challenge prohibitions on
gun ownership for two specified classes of individuals-felons and the
52. AMAR, supra note 50, at 322.
53. See discussion supra Part I.B.
54. THE FEDERALIST No. 28 (Alexander Hamilton) (writing that "[i]f the representatives of
the people betray their constituents, there is then no resource left but in the exertion of that
original right of self-defense which is paramount to all positive forms of government, and which
against the usurpations of the national rulers, may be exerted with infinitely better prospect of
success than against those of the rulers of an individual state. In a single state .... [t]he citizens
must rush tumultuously to arms, without concert, without system, without resource").
55. PATRICK J. CHARLES, THE SECOND AMENDMENT: THE INTENT AND ITS INTERPRETATION
BY THE STATES AND THE SUPREME COURT 131 (2009). See, e.g., PA. CONST. art. IX, § 21(1790)
("the right of citizens to bear arms, in defence of themselves and the State, shall not be
questioned"); VT. CONST. Declaration of Rights, art. XVI ("the people have a right to bear arms,
for defence of themselves and the State"); Ky. CONST. art. X, § 23 (1799) ("the rights of the
citizens to bear arms in defence of themselves and the State shall not be questioned"); OHIO
CONST. art. VIII, § 20 (1802) ("the people have a right to bear arms for the defense of themselves
and the state"); Miss. CONST. art. I, § 23 (1817) ("Every citizen has a right to bear arms, in
defence of himself and the State"); CONN. CONST. art. I, § 17 (1818) ("Every citizen has a right to
bear arms in defence of himself and the state"); ALA. CONST. art. I, § 23 (1819) ("Every citizen
has a right to bear arms in defence of himself and the state").
56. Dennis A. Henigan, The Heller Paradox, 56 UCLA L. REV. 1171, 1186 (2009) But see
Eugene Volokh, The Commonplace Second Amendment, 73 N.Y.U. L. REv. 793, 811-12 (1998).
57. Henigan, supra note 56, at 1186.
58. Id. at 1194.
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mentally ill.59 The two examples provide barely a glimpse into which
other categories of prohibitions the Court intended to exclude by anal-
ogy. Federal gun control statutes have prohibited gun ownership by
felons from as early as 1968. Similarly, federal law has also prohibited
persons adjudicated as mentally incompetent and persons placed in
mental institutions from gun ownership since 1968. However, federal
law also prohibited the ownership of guns by minors and drug users and
addicts as early as 1968,60 yet the Court in Heller failed to include these
categories of prohibitions in its list of exclusions for no apparent reason.
In one sense the Court's provision of these two examples is puz-
zling, perhaps denoting a kind of shorthand by the Court. Intentional
ambiguity may have also been useful for the Court in this context
because it allows for unlimited flexibility in interpretation. Had the
Court specifically listed each of the four categories of prohibitions found
in the Gun Control Act of 1968 as exclusions, lower courts would have
been somewhat constrained in arguing that any prohibition outside of the
these classes should be considered "presumptively lawful." By merely
noting two such prohibitions, and mischaracterizing the latter prohibi-
tion,61 the Court injected a practical level of uncertainty. Lower courts
may freely question from where the Court drew these excluded
prohibitions.
Realistically, however, the Court's specific mention of these two
classes of prohibitions provides some guidance to lower courts facing
second amendment challenges to gun ownership laws. For our purposes,
the first question becomes whether domestic violence misdemeanants
represent a class of persons comparable to felons and the mentally ill so
that the Heller list would classify section 922(g)(9) as a "presumptively
lawful regulatory measure."
A felon is defined as "a person who commits a felony," which is a
crime "punishable by death or by imprisonment for more than one
year."'62 Section 922(g)(9)'s domestic violence misdemeanants are a
class of persons distinctly different from felons. By strict definition,
misdemeanants are persons who have committed a crime "usually pun-
ishable by incarceration for up to one year. "63
However, definitions alone do not resolve the problem. One must in
addition consider the policy reasoning behind the prohibition on gun
ownership by felons. Arguably, these prohibitions have arisen for two
59. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2816-17 (2008).
60. Gun Control Act, 18 U.S.C. § 922 (1968).
61. 18 U.S.C § 922(g)(4) (2006) (prohibiting persons "who has[ve] been adjudicated as a
mental defective or who halve] been committed to a mental institution" from possessing firearms).
62. WEBSTER's LEGAL DICTIONARY 99 (2d ed. 1996).
63. Id. at 165.
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reasons. First, policymakers have been concerned with permitting felons
to own firearms because such persons may be considered "at-risk" of
committing future, potentially violent crimes, 64 although even non-vio-
lent felons are precluded from gun ownership. Second, such prohibitions
may be viewed as a kind of lost privilege.
Historically,65 one can understand these purposes by turning to the
Republican ideology behind the Second Amendment, which entangled
the right to bear arms with the idea of the "virtuous citizen. 66 Accord-
ingly, lower courts have attempted to resolve the inconsistency between
the originalist focus of Heller's holding and the flexible nature of Hel-
ler's list of exclusions by once again focusing on the framers' intent. For
instance, the court in United States v. Li explained that: "at the time of
the framing, the most ardent supporters of a specific amendment guaran-
teeing an individual right to keep and bear arms recognized that con-
victed felons and those who engaged in violent criminal activity would
not enjoy the benefit of such a right. 67
Within this framework, domestic violence misdemeanants appear
as a class of persons comparable to felons. 68 In fact, the legislative his-
tory behind the enactment section 922(g)(9) details Congress's concern
that domestic violence misdemeanants, while not felons, have exhibited
violent behavior and are likely a potential danger to their families.
Allowing such persons to own guns merely increases this risk. Much of
the reason behind section 922(g)(9)'s enactment was the concern that
states do not effectively charge domestic violence offenses as felonies,
thereby allowing such "at-risk" persons to own firearms. As Senator
Lautenberg expressed:
Under current Federal law, it is illegal for persons convicted of
64. See United States v. Huddleston, 415 U.S. 814, 825 (1974) (noting that Congress passed
the Gun Control Act of 1968 to keep firearms from classes of persons it considered dangerous);
United States v. Luedtke, 589 F. Supp. 2d 1018, 1021-22 (E.D. Wis. 2008) (explaining that
"[laws] barring felons and the mentally ill from access to weapons have historically been based on
the society determination that such individuals pose a particular danger"). See also S. REP. No.
90-1501, at 22 (1968) (describing the purpose behind the Gun Control Act of 1968 as preventative
by keeping "firearms out of the hands of those not legally entitled to possess them because of age,
criminal background, or incompetency"); 114 CONG. REc. 13, 219 (1968) (Congress sought to
keep firearms "out of the hands of criminals, drug addicts, mentally disordered persons, juveniles,
and other persons whose possession of them is too high a price in danger to us all to allow").
65. See discussion supra Part II.B. 1.
66. See Luedtke, 589 F. Supp. 2d at 1021-22 (citing Glenn Harlan Reynolds, A Critical Guide
to the Second Amendment, 62 TENN. L. REV. 461, 480 (1995). See also discussion supra Part
IIB. 1.
67. No. 08-CR-212, 2008 WL 4610318, at *3 (E.D. Wis. Oct. 15, 2008).
68. See United States v. Engstrum, 609 F. Supp. 2d 1227, 1233-34 (D. Utah 2009). But as the
court in Engstrum noted, "not all domestic violence misdemeanants have shown that they cannot
control themselves or are prone to fits of violent rage." Id.
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felonies to possess firearms, yet, many people who engage in serious
spousal or child abuse ultimately are not charged with or convicted of
felonies. At the end of the day, due to outdated laws or thinking,
perhaps after a plea bargain, they are, at most, convicted of a misde-
meanor. . . . This amendment would close this dangerous loophole
and keep guns away from violent individuals who threaten their own
families, people who have shown that they cannot control themselves
and are prone to fits of violent rage directed, unbelievable enough,
against their own loved ones.6 9
But such a broad interpretation of comparability raises concerns, espe-
cially in light of Heller's focus on originalism and framers' intent.
Under such reasoning, a court may uphold, with little to no scrutiny, 70 a
newly created prohibition on the possession of firearms, so long as Con-
gress's stated purpose behind the prohibition is to prevent so-called
"dangerous" persons from possessing such firearms.
The reasoning is circular because essentially the courts are broadly
deferring to Congress, rather than scrutinizing congressional limitations
to the individual right to bear arms. Lower courts interpret Heller as
permitting prohibitions on firearm possession by classes of persons simi-
lar to felons and the mentally ill. But in determining which classes of
persons qualify, lower courts routinely take congressional statements
concerning these classes of persons at face value. In light of Heller,
lower courts should at least provide some level of scrutiny when deter-
mining the validity of such prohibitions, or actively inquire into the
comparability of classes-courts should by no means avoid both these
tasks.
3. LONGSTANDING PROHIBITIONS-QUALIFICATION IN
TEMPORAL TERMS
In order to fully interpret Heller's use of the phrase "longstanding
prohibitions," one must also trace the reasoning behind state gun control
legislation along with the fairly recent history of federal gun control
laws. This Part argues that the prohibition on the possession of firearms
by domestic violence misdemeanants under section 922(g)(9) cannot be
69. 142 CONG. Ruc. S10, 377-01 (1997). But Congress also noted that section 92 2 (g)(9)
would "not make life better for many women who are abused, even when guns are in the
home.... [because] most domestic violence is not even reported"). This statement suggests that
section 922(g)(9)'s prohibition on the possession of firearms by domestic violence misdemeanants
is both over and underinclusive-it is overinclusive because it broadly prohibits all such
misdemeanants from gun possession, failing to distinguish between levels of dangerousness or the
gravity of offense, and it is underinclusive because if spouses fail to report most incidents of
domestic violence, then a significant amount of domestic abusers still possess the right to possess
a firearm. Such results are absurd.
70. See discussion infra Part IV.
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considered "longstanding" under any definition of the term.7'
a. State Regulation of Firearms Ownership
Debates over the regulation of firearms date back to the early
decades of the nineteenth century, where Americans first developed an
individualist view of the rights to bear arms. It was during this time that
state legislatures first began weighing their concerns over the carrying of
concealed weapons against individual rights to bear arms in self-
defense.72 In 1813, Kentucky distinguished itself as the first state to reg-
ulate the possession of concealed weapons.73 Louisiana, Indiana, and
New York followed suit in the years to come, with New York's Gover-
nor deeming the practice of carrying concealed weapons a "threat to
public liberty."74
Much like the debate leading up to the Court's decision in Heller,
"[t]he enactment of these early gun control statutes prompted a backlash
that produced . [a] systematic defense of an individual right to bear
arms in self-defense. 75 In response to such hasty enactment of arms
regulations, other states amended their constitutions, broadening provi-
sions to allow for an individual right to bear arms, albeit under limited
circumstances.76
But the individual right to bear arms, developing under state consti-
tutional law, was merely one theory that developed during this era,
another involved the idea that the individual right to bear arms was not
contingent on notions of self-defense, but rather on the ability of the
individuals to rise up and bear arms in revolt against their government.77
The Reconstruction era, however, popularized a competing theory
of Second Amendment jurisprudence-collective rights theory.78 In
1911, this theory provided the most basic rationale for New York's pas-
sage of comprehensive gun control regulation-the Sullivan law, which
71. It is worth noting that some lower courts seem to be misapplying Heller's standard.
Rather than requiring a prohibition to meet each prong of the Heller test-comparability of classes
and temporal comparability-some courts have explained that a prohibition qualifies as
longstanding under Heller by meeting either prong of the test. See United States v. Luedtke, 589
F. Supp. 2d 1018, 1021 (E.D. Wis. 2008) (explaining that "the Lautenberg Amendment does not
represent a longstanding prohibition," but maintaining that "a useful approach is to ask whether a
statutory prohibition against the possession of firearms by felons and the mentally ill is similar
enough to the statutory prohibition against the possession of firearms by" domestic violence
misdemeanants.)
72. SAUL CORNELL, A WELL REGULATED MIMA, 137-38 (2006).
73. Id. at 141.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 138.
76. Id. at 142-44.
77. Id. at 152-53.
78. Id. at 187-88.
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restricted both possession of firearms in certain locations, including an
individual's home, and also "instituted a license requirement for the
ownership of handguns."'7 9
Supporters of the collective rights theory won the debate, and gun
control regulations became commonplace to the point where "[iut is esti-
mated that there are more than 20,000 federal, state, and local gun con-
trol laws" in existence now.8° Current state gun control laws generally
include prohibitions on the possession of firearms by minors, licensing
requirements, prohibitions on the purchase of certain kinds of firearms,
and regulations on the carrying of concealed weapons, to name a few.8
As to restricted classes of persons, states typically prohibit felons from
possessing firearms, but do not extend such prohibitions to addicts and
mentally ill persons.82
b. Federal Regulation of Firearms Ownership
The early decades of the twentieth century brought the federal gov-
ernment into the realm of gun control legislation, with passage of the
National Firearms Act of 1934, which regulated the purchase of certain
kinds of guns through heavy taxation on the sales of such guns.83 In
1938 Congress passed the Federal Firearms Act, the first legislation of
its kind seeking to "prevent the criminal class from using firearms."
8 4
These initial gun control statutes remained the "only federal fire-
arms legislation" until the passage of the Gun Control Act of 1968
("GCA").85 Because of its focus on regulating the possession of firearms
by particular classes of individuals, the GCA offers considerable insight
into our analysis. A distinct purpose behind the GCA was to "keep[ ]
firearms out of the hands of those not legally entitled to possess them
because of age, criminal background or incompetency."86 The GCA
79. Id. at 197.
80. WARREN FREEDMAN, THE PRIVILEGE TO KEEP AND BEAR ARMS: THE SECOND
AMENDMENT AND ITS INTERPRETATION 73 (1989).
81. See HARRY L. WILSON, GUNS, GUN CONTROL, AND ELECTIONS: THE POLITICS AND POLICY
OF FIREARMS 86 (2007).
82. See GARY KLECK, POINT BLANK: GUNS AND VIOLENCE IN AMERICA 326 (2005).
83. JAMES B. JACOBS, CAN GUN CONTROL WORK? 20-21 (2002).
84. JACOBS, supra note 83, at 21. Congress aimed to regulate possession of firearms by
specific classes of persons-"those who posed an unacceptably high risk of misusing a firearm."
At the time, the act prohibited fugitives, indicted persons, and persons "convicted of a crime of
violence" from purchasing a firearm. Id. at 22. (emphasis added).
85. FREEDMAN, supra note 80, at 74.
86. id.; JACOBS, supra note 83, at 24; JoHN M. BRUCE & CLYDE WILCox, THE CHANGING
POLITICS OF GUN CONTROL 184 (1998). But see In re United States, 578 F.3d 1195, 1195 (10th
Cir. 2009) (Murphy, J., dissenting) (stating that "it is not at all clear [that Congress's] finding
regarding the dangerous of domestic violence misdemeanants is constitutionally sufficient to
warrant a blanket ban on firearm possession").
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expanded the FFA by prohibiting gun ownership by four classes of per-
sons: minors, persons adjudicated mentally incompetent, felons and
fugitives, and addicts and unlawful users of controlled substances. 87
Essentially the GCA "was of limited use in making firearms more diffi-
cult for ineligible classes to obtain, but ... [in fact] made it possible to
convict persons ineligible to have guns if they were later apprehended
with a firearm." 88
At the most basic level, one can assume that the GCA's prohibi-
tions on the possession of firearms by these classes of persons would
qualify as "longstanding" for two reasons. Primarily, such prohibitions
would likely be considered longstanding because of their longevity-
having remained viable law for over forty years. Secondly, these
prohibitions are arguably longstanding because they were the first such
ownership prohibitions enacted by the federal government.
This is not to suggest that solely the GCA's original prohibitions
may qualify as longstanding under the Heller list. The Court in Heller
may have intended to protect a broader class of prohibitions from consti-
tutional challenge. Such prohibitions are found with the 1986 Mclure-
Volkmer amendments to the GCA, the Firearms Owners' Protection Act
("FOPA") and include prohibitions on the possession of firearms by
felons, fugitives from justice, unlawful users of controlled substances,
persons adjudicated as mentally incompetent, illegal aliens, persons dis-
honorably discharged from military service, and persons who have
renounced U.S. citizenship.89 Worth noting also is the fact that the
FOPA provides that "all persons barred from receiving firearms may
seek relief from the disability, including felons."9 Domestic violence
misdemeanants under section 922(g)(9) are in fact barred from such
relief.91
The Court in Heller could have practically only meant one of two
things by its use of the term "longstanding." First, the Court, consistent
with its originalist rationale, may have intended for "longstanding
prohibitions" to include those prohibitions on firearm possession con-
templated by the framers. Under this framework, the prohibition on the
87. Franklin E. Zimring, Firearms and Federal Law: The Gun Control Act of 1968, 7
JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES 133, 152 (1975). See also JACOBS, supra note 83, at 19 (explaining
that "[u]p until now, the principal federal policy is that law-abiding adults should be allowed to
purchase and possess firearms, at least in their homes, but that dangerous classes of people should
be denied access to guns").
88. Zimring, supra note 87, at 154.
89. FREEDMAN, supra note 80, at 74, JACOBS, supra note 83, at 27. See 18
U.S.C. 922(g)(l)-(7).
90. See 18 U.S.C. § 925(c) (2006); Lovell v. U.S. Dep't of Treasury, Bureau of Alcohol,
Tobacco, & Firearms, 867 F. Supp. 571 (W. D. Mich. 1994); FREEDMAN, supra note 80, at 75.
91. See § 925(a)(1).
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possession of firearms by domestic violence misdemeanants would
surely fail to qualify as longstanding. But this first interpretation seems
somewhat narrow and politically troubling by leaving lower courts to
inquire into the framers' intent to determine the constitutionality of par-
ticular firearm possession laws. A second, and more reasonable, inter-
pretation is that the Court intended a more commonplace definition of
"longstanding"-meaning simply a prohibition that has existed for a
"long duration.""2 Once again, section 922(g)(9) should not qualify.
Assuming that a lower court determines that domestic violence
misdemeanants qualify as a class of persons comparable to felons-
because of their propensity for danger-a court should not automatically
find that section 922(g)(9) is a longstanding prohibition, subject to little
or no scrutiny, under Heller. The best argument for including section
922(g)(9) as a longstanding prohibition is that its time of enactment is
irrelevant, but once again such an interpretation renders portions of the
Court's language in Heller superfluous.93 Although the Court failed to
define "longstanding," common sense suggests that a prohibition that
came into existence barely a decade ago is not longstanding when com-
pared to prohibitions that have existed for the past seventy years. Con-
gress did not enact section 922(g)(9) until 1996. Such recent enactment
militates against a finding that section 922(g)(9) qualifies as a longstand-
ing prohibition under Heller.94
As the Supreme Court explained in Giles v. California:
Domestic violence is an intolerable offense that legislatures may
choose to combat through many means-from increasing criminal
penalties to adding resources for investigation and prosecution to
funding awareness and prevention campaigns. But for that serious
crime... abridging the constitutional rights of criminal defendants is
not in the State's arsenal.95
While Congress may in fact have valid reasons for regulating the posses-
sion of firearms by domestic violence misdemeanants, such reasoning is
insufficient to protect such legislation from constitutional scrutiny.
Lower courts cannot continuously turn to Heller as a means of avoiding
or quickly dismissing a Second Amendment challenge to section
92. See Merriam-Webster's Online Dictionary, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/
longstanding (last visited May 23, 2010).
93. See discussion supra Part III.
94. See In re United States, 578 F.3d 1195, 1195 (10th Cir. 2009) (Murphy, J., dissenting)
(arguing that § 922(g)(9) is "not a longstanding statute prohibiting possession of a firearm"
because it was only just enacted in 1996).
95. 128 S. Ct. 2678, 2693 (2008) (this case involved Sixth Amendment concerns over
constitutionality rather than Second Amendment concerns).
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922(g)(9) as if Heller unequivocally resolved the issue-the question
remains confused.
IV. LEVELS OF SCRUTINY
As discussed in Section III, it is improper for the Eleventh Circuit
to presume that section 922(g)(9) is valid based on the language from
Heller. A survey of cases demonstrates that other courts have been eval-
uating the constitutionality of the statute under either intermediate scru-
tiny or intermediate scrutiny. It is clear that Heller rules out rational-
basis review.96 The Court stated that rational basis could not be used to
"evaluate the extent to which a legislature may regulate a specific, enu-
merated right . . ." Additionally, Heller makes clear that the district
courts should not apply Justice Breyer's balancing test.97 This leaves
intermediate and strict scrutiny. 98
The first option Heller left open is intermediate scrutiny. The Sev-
enth Circuit applied intermediate scrutiny to a section 922(g)(9) chal-
lenge in United States v. Skoien.99 In that case, Skoien was convicted of
a section 922(g)(9) violation after his probation officer found a hunting
rifle in his truck. 100 The court asked whether the government could
establish that the statute was "substantially related to an important gov-
96. Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2818, n.27 (citing United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S.
144, 152, n.4 (1938)); see also United States v. Skoien, 587 F.3d 805 (7th Cir. 2010).
97. Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2821, see also Skoien, 587 F.3d at 805.
98. There is another method for evaluating the constitutionality of gun control laws proposed
by Professor Volokh. He suggests that courts should consider four categories for justifications on
restrictions of the right to bear arms. Eugene Volokh, Implementing the Right to Keep and Bear
Arms for Self-Defense: An Analysitical Framework and Research Agenda, 56 UCLA L. REV.
1443, 1446 (2009). Once the court evaluates the scope, burden, danger reduction, and government
as proprietor, the court can determine whether it is proper to strike down the restriction. Id. at
1446-47. Professor Volokh addressed how his categories would apply to restrictions on specific
classes of people, including the restriction on individuals convicted of domestic violence
misdemeanors. Id. at 1497-1516. Because any total ban is a substantial burden, courts must look
to scope or danger reduction justifications to determine the constitutionality of the restriction. Id.
at 1497. A scope justification would require that those who enacted the constitutional provision
meant to exclude certain individuals from the scope of the right. Id. Justification based on danger
to society would mean that notwithstanding the text and original meaning of the provision, certain
individuals are not trustworthy enough to own guns. Id. One district court has followed this
approach when evaluating section 922(g)(8). United States v. Luedtke, 589 F. Supp. 2d 1018,
1019 (E.D. Wis. 2008). See also United States v. Hendrix, No. 09-cr-56-bbc, 2010 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 33756 (W.D. Wis. Apr. 6, 2010) (applying the Volokh approach to 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(3),
which prohibits individuals who are unlawful uses of marijuana or crack cocaine from possessing
firearms). In Luedtke, the defendant argued that the court must apply strict scrutiny. Luedtke, 589
F. Supp. 2d at 1024 The court disagreed and found that because the Heller Court undertook a
historical analysis of similar gun control restrictions, it was appropriate to compare "the
challenged regulation to those deemed permissible under the Court's historical analysis". Id. at
1024-25.
99. Skoien, 587 F.3d. at 812.
100. Id. at 805.
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ernmental interest."1 °1 The court found little question about the govern-
ment's interest in protecting individuals from gun-related domestic
violence, the question was whether the blanket ban provided a reasona-
ble fit for that objective.10 2 The court found that the "presumptively law-
ful" language from Heller prevents the application of strict scrutiny.
11 3
The Seventh Circuit will review the Skoien decision en banc.'0
4
The district court in Maine has also applied intermediate scrutiny to
section 922(g)(9).10 1 The court considered applying the presumption of
constitutionality approach but was unsure whether to apply it because
such an approach cannot be used for fundamental rights.1"6 The court
noted that it was unclear whether Heller created a fundamental right, and
applied intermediate scrutiny in an "excess of caution."10 7
Finally, the Eastern District of Virginia, following the unpublished
Chester opinion, has applied intermediate scrutiny. 1 8 In United States v.
Walker, the court first determined that the statute is analogous to the
presumptively lawful restrictions listed in Heller, and should be upheld
for that reason alone.' 9 The court then evaluated the constitutionality of
the statute based on the unpublished recommendation from the Fourth
Circuit.110 The court found that nothing in the Heller opinion indicated
that strict scrutiny should be used, and that because Walker claimed he
kept the gun for hunting, not for self-defense, intermediate scrutiny was
most appropriate.11' The parties stipulated that preventing domestic vio-
lence was an important government interest.'12 The court found that the
government had met its burden by showing that the law "specifically
targets violent offenders, in clearly defined domestic relationships, and
addresses a 'dangerous loophole' identified by Congress."' 13 Addition-
ally, the court noted that intermediate scrutiny permits laws that are
"somewhat over-inclusive." '114
Intermediate scrutiny has received some criticism. Professor
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 811.
104. United States v. Skoien, No. 08-3770, 2010 WL 1267262 at *1 (7th Cir. Feb. 22, 2010).
105. United States v. Pettengill, No. CR-09-138-B-W, 2010 WL 374437 (D. Me. Feb. 1,
2010).
106. Id. at *7, n.8 (citing Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 320-21 (1993)).
107. Id.
108. United States v. Walker, No. 3:09CR358-HEH, 2010 WL 1640340 (E.D. Va. Apr. 21,
2010).
109. Id. at *3.
110. Id. at *4.
111. Id. at *5.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id.
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Eugene Volokh argues that intermediate scrutiny is not an appropriate
standard here because, first, it is likely that every gun control law serves
some legitimate interest.' 15 Second, if the reasonable relationship must
be proven through social science, then it will be impossible to prove."16
If the relationship must be only "intuitively persuasive," then it will
always be met." 7 Some of these concerns were illustrated in Walker.
The second approach, a minority approach used by one district
court, is strict scrutiny." 8 The defendant challenged the statute as
applied to him because it imposed an impermissible burden on his Sec-
ond Amendment right because he kept the gun solely for the purpose of
home defense." 9 The court found that in Heller the Court declared the
right of home defense to be a fundamental right.1 20 The court based this
finding on the language from Heller that provides "[b]y the time of the
founding, the right to have arms had become fundamental for English
subjects." 121 The court applied strict scrutiny for two reasons: first, the
right to keep and bear arms is a fundamental right after Heller, and the
Tenth Circuit applies strict scrutiny to fundamental rights. 122 Second, the
Supreme Court categorized Second Amendment rights with other funda-
mental rights, which receive strict scrutiny review. 23
The court found the strict scrutiny standard was met in this case,
but was careful to note that it may not be met in all such cases. The court
found the government did have a compelling interest in protecting others
in the household by preventing those who pose a risk of violence from
possessing firearms.' 24 The court noted that not all individuals who may
be convicted under section 922(g)(9) pose a risk of violence and that
even under strict scrutiny, such individuals should not be deprived of
their Second Amendment rights. 125 The court found that the statute was
narrowly tailored, but this was in part because the Tenth Circuit has
specifically narrowed section 922(g)(9) to require physical force to be
115. Volok, supra note 98, at 1470.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. United States v. Engstrum, 609 F. Supp. 2d 1277 (D. Utah 2009). See also United States
v. Bena, No. 10-CR-07-LLR, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 33945 (N.D. Iowa Apr. 6, 2010) (declining
to select a level of scrutiny, but noting that 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8) would survive even strict
scrutiny) United States v. Luedtke, 589 F. Supp. 2d 1018, 1019 (E.D. Wis. 2008) (applying the
Volokh approach, but noting that 922(g)(8) would survive strict scrutiny). But see Skoien, 587
F.3d at 811 n.5 (expressing doubt as to whether section 922(g)(9) could survive strict scrutiny).
119. Id. at 1230.
120. Id.
121. Id. (quoting Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2798).
122. Id. at 1231.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 1233.
125. Id. at 1234.
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more than physical contact. 26 It must have "some degree of power or
violence." 127 The court rejected the defendant's argument that there
must be an exception for home defense.' 28 While expressing some con-
cern that the statute might prevent an individual who does not pose a
risk of violence from owning a gun, the court stated that it could not find
as a matter of law that the defendant was entitled to a constitutional
exception to section 922(g)(9).129
Examining recent decisions makes clear that the Eleventh Circuit's
presumption of the constitutionality of section 922(g)(9) was not the
only option. Numerous other federal courts have subjected the statute to
constitutional muster, either strict or intermediate scrutiny. Based on the
reasons discussed in Section III, the Eleventh Circuit should have fol-
lowed one of these approaches in White.
V. CONCLUSION
The Eleventh Circuit's decision in United States v. White, uphold-
ing the constitutionality of section 922(g)(9) in light of a Second
Amendment challenge, is flawed in two primary respects. First, the court
misinterpreted Heller's list of exclusions to include section 922(g)(9) as
a longstanding prohibition. The court based such reasoning on limited
inquiry, stressing that domestic violence misdemeanants were a class of
persons comparable to felons, but failing to acknowledge the temporal
element required for a prohibition to qualify as "longstanding" under
Heller. Second, and more problematically, the court further miscon-
strued Heller's "presumptively lawful" language. In this respect, the
court failed to acknowledge that constitutional challenges based on a
fundamental right-such as the right to bear arms-demand judicial
scrutiny. Although the Supreme Court has yet to establish the appropri-
ate level of scrutiny in second amendment cases and despite a lack of
consensus among the circuits, the Eleventh Circuit's quick deference to
Congress in White has its failings. Until the Supreme Court provides
further guidance in the realm of Second Amendment jurisprudence,
lower courts will continue to wrestle uncomfortably with such
challenges.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 1235.
20101 1525
